It was utterly clear that Vladimir Putin was not to seek a third term almost two years ago. Sources close to him already then stated that he actually was ‘tired’ with this job and was looking for some other office with somewhat more behind the scenes authority and influence. It is argued by these sources that he might return back to the Kremlin at a later stage but that this was not yet decided.

Putin more than once made it clear that he is firmly commited to resign in 2008. This has triggered increasingly tense relations within the different elite camps Putin had raised to power and influence since about 2003; in the past months tensions turned into serious infighting. The battle was on between the technocratic-economic camp – represented in government by First Deputy Prime Minister D. Medvedev, Economic and Trade Minister G. Gref and Finance Minister A. Kudrin – and the siloviki, with people like FSB-Director Patrushev, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration I. Sechin and some others.

The moderate economic liberals put D. Medvedev on their shield; the hard core siloviki-camp, however, was left without any serious contender for the presidency, but kept putting pressure on Putin to stay in office beyond 2008. Contrary to western press reports, the second crown prince for the Putin succession, former Defense Minister and current First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov is not the presidential candidate of the siloviki camp. Well, Ivanov is himself a silovik, but someone very independent-minded and distant to the core group of the siloviki. It is only a slight exaggeration to call him a loner.

Putin was faced with two options at the beginning of this year: Either he was to make a decision in this fall to sack the government and appoint as Head of Government the heir he had chosen for himself, thus repeating the 1999 scenario. The other option was to decide closer to the date of the presidential elections who to support as his heir.

The first option would have made clear on whose side Putin was on and giving him more leeway to end to the infighting within his entourage which actually has a negative impact on the efficiency of Putin’s government. With the losers desperate to keep their positions of political and, much more important, economic power they would have accepted their defeat in order to be kept within the echelons of power. This option however was quite risky as it most likely would have turned Putin into a ‘lame duck’ with authority and power quickly gravitating towards the appointed successor.

The second option would have allowed Putin to remain a strong president until the very end of his presidential term and keep the two camps at bay and dependent on who Putin would eventually endorse. This would, however, left little time to sell the heir to the public; much more important though this would not have allowed the chosen successor to assemble his team in time in order to have a quick-start immediately after the elections in March 2008.

Putin has chosen the second option. The decision to appoint Viktor Zubkov Head of Government actually is no indication of whom Putin would eventually endorse for the presidential succession. Zubkov is neither a member of the liberal economist’s camp nor someone associated with the security services. The decision has been postponed. It can definitely be ruled out that Zubkov was to become Putins heir. Zubkov is far too old for even the best spin doctors and the regime loyal electronic media to sell to the Russian society. Why giving up a sportive and young president for a grey and ageing bureaucrat? It is also wrong to compare Zubkov to Putin when the latter was appointed Head of Government back in August 1999. Sure, Putin too was unknown to the public at the time, but he held positions of remarkable influence when he was chosen by Yeltsin.

Zubkov is the right man for Putin to pursue the second option. He might well stay until after the elections but then hand in his resignation to the elected President – as is required by the Russian Constitution anyway.

But why then Putin decided to replace Fradkov by Zubkov? Why not leave Fradkov Head of Government for the final months of Putin’s presidency? According to my opinion the most plausible explanation is that Putin preferred to have a loyal person and a friend in place for the difficult months a head. Fradkov has definitely been loyal to Putin for all the past three years but never has been an intimate friend of Putin.

As of today, it is most likely that Putin will make his final decision on who to support in the presidential election January 2008. I consider it unlikely, though, that he will appoint that person as Head of Government. The scenario Putin has chosen to select his heir does not follow the 1999 plot. The next president will not have been Head of Government before.

It is by all means speculation who that person will be. Personally I think it will be neither Medvedev nor Ivanov. If I had to bet I would name Dmitry Kozak as the most likely choice of Putin.

This blog entry – renamed ‘Still an Open Question‘ – was published exclusively by Russian online portal www.russiaprofile.org on September 13th, 2007.

This blog posting was also published somewhat altered on Johnson’s Russia List 195, September 13th, 2007 as # 29 with the title ‘Succession Decision Still Open’.

Picture taken from: seattletimes.nwsource.com/…/12/ 2003881745.jpg