On this very blog only a couple of days ago I argued that Medvedev’s announcement to appoint Vladimir Putin as Head of Government was, among other reasons, an electoral ploy. A few minutes ago, however, Putin announced at the Edinaya Rossiya congress in Moscow to accept the government office. My view had been shared by many Russian affairs analysts. We got it wrong.

If you’ve been wrong, you should better refrain from trying to explain why you are not to be blamed for your mistake. So I’ll remain silent for a while and try to fix everything again …

Yet again, social scientists cannot afford not to interpret realities. So briefly my educated guess:

1. Putin’s support for Medvedevs presidential candidacy was a terrible blow to the hard core siloviki around Sechin, Patrushev, Bastrykin and V. Ivanov.

2. These chekisty had already in the weeks before Putin’s decision waged an aggressive onslaught on rivaling siloviki led by the Head of Putin’s Presidential Guard Zolotov, FSNK Head Cherkesov, Attorney General Chaika but also against members of the liberal-technocratic camp which Medvedev is considered close too. The most prominent victim of this campaign so far is deputy finance minister Storchak.

3. These fights have threatened to spin out of control in the past weeks with the hard core siloviki slightly gaining the upper hand.

Reasoning on these premises Putin’s decision to support Medvedev was meant to reign in the hard core siloviki without crushing them alltogether – the latter being far too dangerous for Putin.

His decision to become Head of Government without increasing the constitutional prerogatives of the office might be an effort to rebalance the infighting camps and signal the hard core siloviki that he will take appropriate care of their interests even after the liberal-technocrats will haven taken the Presideny.

Putin thus will aim to remain an arbiter between the rivalling camps. The underlying reasoning might be: I will not leave, but stay to keep the house in order as long as the new landlord (Medvedev) lives up to his task and can take over as a president strong enough by authority to guarantee political stability by himself. If this is indeed what underlies his decision, this will be a high-risk exercise. If Putin despite all these inherent risks and dangers still sticks to it, this might be an indicator how serious behind-the-secenes-battles actually are and how close Russia currently is to open instability.

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